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FRIEND OR FOE OF THE U.S. LABOR 
MARKET: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD RAISE 
OR ELIMINATE THE H-1B VISA CAP 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 2 and April 3, 2007, the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Service (USCIS) received over 123,000 applications from 
employers seeking to hire H-1B (specialty) workers in the United States.1 
The H-1B visa category is a “vehicle through which qualified aliens may 
seek admission to the United States on a temporary basis to work in their 
fields of expertise.”2 It allows U.S. employers, mainly information 
technology (IT) companies, to recruit and hire foreign workers possessing 
special skills and training for up to six years.3 Because Congress has 
implemented a 65,000 annual cap on admission of H-1B workers in the 
United States,4 April 2 and 3, 2007 were the first and only days the USCIS 
accepted applications for H-1B workers for fiscal year 2008.5
Because the number of applications exceeded the congressionally 
mandated cap of 65,000, the USCIS was forced to create a lottery,
 
6 leading 
to the rejection of thousands of timely submitted applications.7 As a result 
of the immediate fulfillment of the cap, many U.S. employers were unable 
to hire employees with sufficient training and experience to meet their 
needs.8 Furthermore, many aliens, residing in the United States and 
attending U.S. educational institutions in anticipation of being placed in 
U.S. jobs, have been and will be forced to leave the country when their F 
and J educational visas expire.9
                                                                                                                 
 1. Robert Pear, High-Tech Titans Strike Out on Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2007, 
at 1. Also note that April 1, 2007 was a Sunday and thus acceptance of applications did not begin 
until April 2. 
 2. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECIALTY OCCUPATION WORKERS (H-1B): 
FISCAL YEAR 2005 (2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/ 
H1B_FY05_Characteristics.pdf [hereinafter 2005 H-1B CHARACTERISTICS]. 
 3. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1184(g)(4) (2009). 
 4. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(vii) (2009). 
 5. Pear, supra note 1. See also Arnold Schwarzenegger et al., Governor Schwarzenegger 
Leads Multi-State Push for Immigration Reform to Protect Skilled Workforce, STATE NEWS 
SERVICE, Sept. 11, 2007. 
 6. Chris O’Brien, How many H-1B workers? Counts vary, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 
15, 2007, at Science and Tech Section (“[T]he immigration service conducts a lottery to award the 
visas.”). 
 Finally, companies that experience labor 
 7. Hilary Potkewitz, Professional Visas Sell Out on First Day, CRAIN’S NEW YORK 
BUSINESS.COM, Apr. 4, 2007, http://www.newyorkbusiness.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID= 
/20070404/FREE/70404007/1064/newsletter01. 
 8. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 9. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Services and Benefits: Student Visas, available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid
=27bc6138f898d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=48819c7755cb9010VgnV
CM10000045f3d6a1RCRD (“The ‘F’ visa is reserved for nonimmigrants wishing to pursue 
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shortages later in the year will not be able to obtain sufficiently skilled 
workers until the next fiscal year, even if they are diligent enough to submit 
their applications on time.10
The legitimacy of the H-1B cap and of the H-1B visa category as a 
whole has been an issue since 1990 when Congress first implemented the 
cap.
 
11 Until 2004, Congress had taken the necessary steps to increase and/or 
decrease the cap according to the anticipated annual demands for H-1B 
workers throughout the U.S. labor force.12 For example, after the cap was 
exhausted for fiscal year13 1998, Congress raised the cap to 115,000 for 
fiscal year 1999.14 In 2000, during the IT boom, Congress increased the cap 
again to 195,000 for fiscal years 2001−2003.15 However, since 2004, 
Congress has refused to increase the 65,000 cap, despite the growing labor 
demand for H-1B workers.16
                                                                                                                 
academic studies and/or language training programs.”); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Services and Benefits: 
Exchange Visitors, available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919 
f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=a4ac6138f898d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgne
xtchannel=48819c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD (“The ‘J’ visa is for educational 
and cultural exchange programs designated by the Department of State, Bureau of Consular 
Affairs.”). 
 For fiscal years 2004−2007, H -1B application 
 10. Stuart Anderson, Should Congress Raise the H-1B Cap?, Testimony of Stuart Anderson, 
Executive Director: National Foundation for American Policy before the House Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims (Mar. 30, 2006) at 3, available at 
http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/articles/Testimony033006.pdf (“Even when new hires are 
not lost, waiting several months for key personnel is expensive and can cost firms dearly in the 
marketplace.”); H-1B Professionals and Wages: Setting the Record Straight, NATIONAL 
FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN POLICY (Mar. 2006) at 2, available at 
http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/articles/NFAPPolicyBriefH1BProfessionalsAndWages03
06.pdf [hereinafter NFAP, Setting the Record Straight] (“In recent years, Congress has failed to 
increase sufficiently the annual limit on H-1B visas for foreign-born professionals, regularly 
leaving U.S. companies unable to hire key personnel for many months.”). 
 11. See Norman Matloff, On the Need for Reform of the H-1B Non-Immigrant Work Visa in 
Computer-Related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 815 (2003) [hereinafter Matloff, On 
the Need for Reform]. 
 12. See sources cited infra notes 14–19. 
 13. Senate.gov, Glossary - “Fiscal Year,” http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/ 
fiscal_year.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009) (defining “fiscal year” as “the accounting period for the 
federal government which begins on October 1 and ends on September 30. The fiscal year is 
designated by the calendar year in which it ends.”). 
 14. Charles Gordon, Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, 2-20 IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE § 20.04, at 1 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2008). See also Steven A. Clark & 
Vincent W. Lau, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL § 5.1.5 (Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., 
2004). 
 15. Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 14, at 1. See also Clark & Lau, supra note 14. 
But see Carolyn Lochhead, Immigration Bill Would Add Visas for Tech Workers, S.F. CHRON., 
Mar. 10, 2006. While this Note does not focus on the political reasons for Congress refusing to 
increase the cap, Lochhead notes that “with the high tech crash and the revelation that some of the 
Sept. 11, 2001 hijackers had entered the country on student visas, the political climate for foreign 
workers darkened, and Congress quietly allowed the number of H-1B visas to plummet back to 
65,000 a year.” Id. 
 16. Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 14, at 1. 
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submissions reached the cap on February 18, 2004, November 23, 2004, 
August 10, 2005 and May 26, 2006, respectively, moving closer to the 
opening date of April 1.17 In 2007, H-1B applications reached the cap for 
fiscal year 2008 on the first day H-1B season opened, April 2, 2007.18 
These statistics clearly show that, while the demand for H-1B visas has 
continued to increase since 2003, Congress refuses to adjust the cap to meet 
the demands of the labor force.19
Critics and advocates of the H-1B program “have staked out seemingly 
irreconcilable positions” on increasing the cap and the H-1B program in 
general.
 
20 Critics question the existence of a labor shortage in the IT 
sector21 and contend that the system displaces American workers from U.S. 
jobs.22 They assert that the program lacks proper administrative 
safeguards,23 allowing U.S. employers to abuse the system and mistreat 
non-citizens.24
Meanwhile, supporters of the H-1B program and a cap increase argue 
that the program enables the United States to remain competitive in the 
global economy,
 
25 and prevents the off-shoring of U.S. jobs to other 
countries.26 These advocates argue three main points on the state of the 
labor market. First, that there is truly a shortage of highly skilled workers as 
evidenced by the annual demand for H-1B visas.27
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Potkewitz, supra note 7 (noting that USCIS accepted applications on April 2 and April 
3 because the statute requires the acceptance period to last at least two days). 
 19. See Indian IT Companies to Acquire More US Firms, PRESS TR. INDIA, Aug. 15, 2007 
(noting that the H-1B cap is not “likely to be raised from the current ceiling of 65,000 anytime 
soon”). 
 20. Todd H. Goodsell, On the Continued Need for H-1B Reform: A Partial, Statutory 
Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. Workers, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 153, 154 (2007). 
 21. See generally Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11. 
 22. See Simone M. Schiller, Does the United States Need Additional High-Tech Work Visas or 
Not? A Critical Look at the So-Called H-1B Visa Debate, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
645, 650 (2001) (“H-1B workers are taking jobs from Americans and giving them to foreigners.”). 
See also John Miano, Testimony of John Miano before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border 
Security, and Claims, House Judiciary Committee (Mar. 23, 2006) at 1 [hereinafter Miano, 
Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration] (“After eleven years, Congress has yet to close 
the loophole allowing direct replacement of U.S. workers by H-1B workers.”). 
 23. Miano, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22 at 1 
(“Congress has established the labor certification process as a ‘rubber stamp’ operation that has no 
value . . . . The data collection and reporting are not adequate to monitor the H-1B program.”). 
 Second, that there is no 
fixed number of jobs available in the U.S. labor market, and both 
compensation and the availability of jobs are based on other factors within 
 24. See generally Norman Matloff, Debunking the Myth of a Desperate Software Labor 
Shortage, Testimony to the U.S. House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration (Apr. 
21, 1998) at Sec. 9.2–9.4, available at http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/itaa.real.html [hereinafter 
Matloff, Debunking the Myth] (discussing problems with prevailing wage difficulties in 
enforcement and indentured servitude). 
 25. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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the labor market,28 thus making the shortage debate moot. Finally, that 
preventing foreigners, especially foreign students enrolled in colleges and 
universities in the United States, from entering the U.S. workforce, is 
“detrimental to our economic success in the future because we will lose 
valuable intellectual capital.”29
II. WHAT IS THE H-1B VISA CATEGORY? 
 
This Note argues that the current cap of 65,000 is inadequate for the 
present U.S. labor force and that the existence of the cap itself is an 
inappropriate and unnecessary element of the H-1B category. Part II of this 
Note describes the H-1B category, its requirements and the safeguards 
implemented by Congress to protect U.S. and foreign workers. Part III 
examines the legislative history of the H-1B category as well as its current 
state. Part IV addresses the leading arguments made by critics who oppose 
raising the H-1B visa cap. Part V lays out some of the most compelling 
arguments for increasing or abolishing the cap entirely and explains why 
industries other than the IT sector are suffering due to the H-1B cap. 
Finally, Part VI of this Note sets forth the most logical solutions for 
reforming the H-1B category. 
The H-1B visa category, designed to bring the world’s “best and 
brightest”30 to the United States, is an employment-based nonimmigrant 
visa “that allows skilled aliens in certain ‘specialty occupations’ to work in 
the United States.”31 The USCIS defines “specialty occupation” as “an 
occupation that requires (a) theoretical and practical application of a body 
of highly specialized knowledge, and (b) attainment of a bachelor’s or 
higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for 
entry into the occupation in the United States.”32 Employers are “required 
to pay H-1B workers either the same rate as other employees with similar 
skills and qualifications or the ‘prevailing wage’ for that occupation and 
location, whichever is higher.”33 The initial stay for an H-1B worker in the 
United States is three years but can be extended to a maximum of six 
years.34
                                                                                                                 
 28. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 12–13. 
 29. Michael R. Traven, Restricting Innovation: How Restrictive U.S. Visa Policies Have the 
Potential to Deplete our Innovative Economy, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 693, 695 (2006). 
 30. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 818. 
 31. Jung S. Hahm, American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998: 
Balancing Economic and Labor Interests Under the New H-1B Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1673, 1674 (2000). 
 32. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1184(i)(1) (2009). 
 While the H-1B category applies across a wide spectrum of 
professions and benefits citizens of a broad range of nations, approximately 
 33. John Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale: Wages for H-1B Computer Programmers, CTR. 
FOR IMMIGR. STUD., Dec. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back1305.html 
[hereinafter Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale]. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n). 
 34. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4). 
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40% of H-1B visas approved each year are in computer-related 
occupations,35 and approximately 42% of the H-1B workers entering the 
United States each year come from India.36
The H-1B visa category is important to the U.S. labor market because 
of the long regulatory delays for green cards.
 
37 Such delays “make it 
virtually impossible to hire an individual directly on a green card,”38 and 
without availability of the H-1B visa, “skilled foreign nationals, particularly 
graduates of U.S. universities, could not work or remain in the United 
States.”39 The H-1B category also permits dual intent, meaning that, 
contrary to various other nonimmigrant visa categories, H-1B workers 
coming to work in the United States are not required to avow their intent to 
leave the United States once their visa has expired. Rather, dual intent 
permits H-1B workers to pursue avenues for permanent residence.40
One of the main critiques of the H-1B visa category is that it promotes 
or allows the displacement of U.S. workers from employment.
 
41 In order to 
curb this risk, Congress has implemented various safeguards to protect U.S. 
workers. Some of the safeguards include the annual cap, a requirement for 
each applying employer to file a Labor Condition Application (LCA) with 
the Department of Labor (DOL), the designation of employers as “H-1B 
dependent” and the addition of various fees to the application process.42
III. HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF THE H-1B 
VISA CAP 
 
The H-1B category was established through the Immigration Act of 
1990.43
                                                                                                                 
 35. 2005 H-1B CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 2, at 2; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS OF 
SPECIALTY OCCUPATION WORKERS (H-1B): FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2006), at 2, available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/H1B_FY04_Characteristics.pdf; U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF 
SPECIALTY OCCUPATION WORKERS (H-1B): FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004), at 2, available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/FY03H1BFnlCharRprt.pdf. 
 36. Id. 
 It was a spin-off of the previous H-1 category and was designed to 
 37. NFAP, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10, at 3. See also USCIS.gov, Processing 
Times, https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/jsps/ptimes.jsp. Green Card visa processing times for 
employment-based immigration range from 2–5 years depending on where the employer is 
located. The process is two parts: I-140 Applications must be approved and then I-485 
applications are filed when a visa becomes available. The processing time for I-140 Applications 
filed at either the Texas or Nebraska Service Center is approximately 16 months and I-485 
processing time varies between 18 and 30 months. 
 38. NFAP, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10, at 3. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 815. 
 41. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 42. See discussion infra Part III. 
 43. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, REPORT ON H-1B PETITIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2005, ANNUAL REPORT 
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“make conditions for granting the visa more precise; add some protections 
for the domestic workforce; and allow dual-intent status so that employers 
could simultaneously sponsor the worker for a green card.”44 The 
protections implemented for the domestic workforce included capping the 
amount of H-1B visas issued annually at 65,000 (subject to increases by 
Congress) and requiring every applying employer to file an LCA with the 
DOL.45
During the high-tech boom of the 1990s, an industry association known 
as the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) produced a 
series of statistical reports “asserting burgeoning gaps and shortages of 
information-technology workers” in the American workforce.
 
46 The United 
States Department of Commerce affirmed the findings of these reports in 
1997.47 Despite criticism, the release of the ITAA reports, along with 
various other publications claiming a labor shortage, convinced the Clinton 
administration to enact the America Competitiveness and Workforce 
Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA 98).48 The ACWIA 98 temporarily 
increased the cap for fiscal year 1999 to 115,000 and also implemented 
further safeguards to protect American workers.49
Specifically, the ACWIA 98 created a new employer category called 
“H-1B dependent” employers, who employ workforces consisting of at 
least 15% H-1B workers. These employers are subject to more intensive 
regulations and penalties. ACWIA 98 requires H-1B dependent employers 
to make a good faith effort to recruit U.S. workers “using procedures that 
meet industry-wide standards and offering compensation that is at least as 
 
                                                                                                                 
(2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/H1B05Annual_08_7.pdf 
[hereinafter 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 44. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 818. 
 45. Id. at 819. 
 46. Michael S. Teitelbaum, Do We Need More Scientists?, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 42 (2003). 
See generally Help Wanted: The IT Workforce Gap at the Dawn of a New Century, Information 
Technology Association of America, Arlington, Virginia, 1997, available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/16/8e/ 
3e.pdf; Help Wanted 1998: A Call for Collaborative Action for the New Millenium, Information 
Technology Association of America and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Mar. 
1998, available at http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/lazowska/press/itaa/WFRpt2.doc. 
 47. See America’s New Deficit: The Shortage of Information Technology Workers, Office of 
Technology Policy, U.S. Department of Commerce (1997), chart at 3, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3797/is_199802/ai_n8804905 (asserting that “between 
1994 and 2005 over one million new computer scientists, engineers, systems analysts, and 
programmers would be required” to fill 820,000 newly created jobs and replace 227,000 workers 
leaving the fields). See also Enid Trucios-Haynes, Immigration Symposium: Temporary Workers 
and Future Immigration Policy Conflicts: Protecting U.S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand for 
Global Human Capital, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 967, 1006 (2002). 
 48. See 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 1; Matloff, On the Need for 
Reform, supra note 11, at 824–25. 
 49. Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 14, at 1. See also Clark & Lau, supra note 14. 
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great as that required to be offered to H-1B nonimmigrants . . . .”50 
Additionally, such employers “must also not have conducted layoffs of 
American workers for a certain period before filing an H-1B petition, and 
must not do so for another time period after filing.”51 Finally, the ACWIA 
98 also created the H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Fee account “to fund 
training and education programs administered by the Department of Labor 
and the National Science Foundation.”52
In addition to enacting regulations to protect U.S. workers, the ACWIA 
98 mandated certain federal administrative agencies to perform studies to 
keep Congress apprised of the domestic labor demand. Specifically, 
ACWIA 98 requires the Attorney General to notify Congress, on a quarterly 
basis, of the number of aliens issued H-1B visas during the preceding three 
months and to issue annual reports specifying the countries of origin and 
occupations of, educational levels attained by, and compensation paid to, H-
1B employees.
 
53 Further, the ACWIA 98 mandated the National Academy 
of Sciences to conduct (1) a study “assessing the status of older workers in 
the information technology field” and (2) a study over the course of the 
subsequent ten years assessing the “labor market needs for workers with 
high technology skills.”54 Despite these measures, none of these mandates 
have been properly complied with, with the exception of the National 
Academy of Sciences ten-year report due sometime in 2009.55
In anticipation of the projected increase in the U.S. workforce’s demand 
for foreign specialty workers, Congress expanded the H-1B category even 
further with the American Competitiveness Act of 2000 (ACA) and the 
untitled Public Law 106-311.
 
56
                                                                                                                 
 50. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, div. C, tit. IV, 412(a) (Title IV of this act is known as the American Competitiveness 
and Workforce Improvement Act) [hereinafter ACWIA 98]. See also Matloff, On the Need for 
Reform, supra note 11, at 825. 
 51. David C. Yang, Globalization and the Transnational Asian “Knowledge Class”, 12 ASIAN 
L.J. 137 (2005), citing Hahm, supra note 31, at 31. 
 52. 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 1. See also ACWIA 98, supra note 
50 at 414(b). Employers were required to pay a fee of $500 for each H-1B application to be put 
into the account for the purposes of training U.S. workers and for low-income scholarship 
programs, grants for mathematics, engineering and science enrichment courses, reform activities 
and duties on petitions. Id. 
 53. 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 1. See also ACWIA 98, supra note 
50 at 414(b). 
 54. Id. 
 The ACA temporarily increased the H-1B 
 55. 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 1 (noting that the Attorney 
General’s quarterly reports for 2002–2005 were not provided until 2006 due to “the transition to 
the Department of Homeland Security”). Also, it is unlikely that the Academy of Sciences will 
issue a timely report because no such study is listed on the Academy of Sciences’ website as 
pending. See generally http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
 56. See 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43 at 1; Matloff, On the Need for 
Reform, supra note 11, at 826. 
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cap to 195,000 for fiscal years 2001−2003.57 In addition to the cap increase, 
the ACA added a number of other provisions to the H-1B category: (1) 
exempting foreign workers employed at an institution of higher education 
or nonprofit entity from the cap;58 (2) increasing portability opportunities 
for H-1B workers to switch employers during their tenure in the United 
States;59 and (3) allowing extensions of H-1B status beyond the six-year 
limit while such alien’s permanent residence application is being 
adjudicated.60 In addition, to further protect U.S. workers, Public Law 106-
311 raised the H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Fee from $500 to $1,000.61
Various additional regulations have passed since the ACA, but none 
have increased the cap. In December 2004, Congress passed the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005, which included the H-1B Visa 
Reform Act of 2004 (RA 2004), raising the H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner 
Fee to $1,500 and implementing a new Fraud Prevention and Detection Fee 
of $500 with each new H-1B application.
 
62 The RA 2004 also added an 
exemption to the H-1B cap for 20,000 additional H-1B visas for aliens who 
earn a master’s degree or higher from a U.S. institution.63 In addition to the 
65,000 cap for regular H-1Bs, the cap for fiscal year 2008 for an additional 
20,000 aliens earning master’s degrees or higher from U.S. universities was 
reached on April 30, 2007.64
In 2005, a number of bills were proposed to Congress seeking to 
implement further safeguards to protect American and foreign workers. 
Examples include the Defend the American Dream Act of 2005 (DADA),
 
65 
and the USA Jobs Protection Act of 2005 (JPA).66 The DADA proposed to 
set more definite guidelines for wage determination,67 a stricter notice 
requirement for employers seeking H-1B employees,68
                                                                                                                 
 57. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-313, 
114 Stat. 1251, 2000 Enacted S. 2045, 106 Enacted S. 2045 (Oct. 17, 2000), at 102 (amending 8 
U.S.C. 1184(g)(1)(A)). 
 58. Id. at 103 (amending 8 U.S.C. 1184(g)). 
 59. Id. at 105 (amending 8 U.S.C. 1184). Portability permits H-1B workers to move to another 
H-1B qualifying employer during the pendency of their H-1B stay in the United States. Id. See 
generally Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 14 (noting that portability allows H-1B 
employees to switch employers during the pendency of their stay in the United States). 
 60. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, supra note 57 at 106 
(amending 8 U.S.C. 1184(g)(4)). 
 61. Nonimmigrant Worker Visa Fee Increase, 106 Pub. L. 311, 114 Stat. 1247, 2000 Enacted 
H.R. 5362 (Oct. 17, 2000). 
 62. Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 209, div. J, tit. IV, 426(a) 
(Dec. 8, 2004); 2005 USCIS H-1B ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43 at 1. 
 63. Allocation of Additional H-1B Visas Created by the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, 70 
Fed. Reg. 23,775 (May 5, 2004) at 23,776. 
 64. O’Brien, supra note 6. 
 65. H.R. 4378, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 17, 2005). 
 66. H.R. 3322, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 18, 2005). 
 67. H.R. 4378, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 17, 2005) at Sec. 2. 
 68. H.R. 4378, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. at Sec. 4. 
 an increase in the 
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petition fee69 and creation of a private right of action for U.S. workers 
displaced by H-1B employees.70 The JPA sought to “prevent unintended 
United States job losses” and to “increase the monitoring and enforcement 
authority of the Secretary of Labor” over the H-1B and other immigration 
programs.71 Neither bill passed Congress.72
In July 2006, Congress considered the American Innovation and 
Competitiveness Act for enactment.
 
73 Buried in this expansive immigration 
bill were provisions “nearly doubling the H-1B skilled-worker temporary 
visas to 115,000 − with an option of raising the cap 20 percent more each 
year.”74 This bill never became law and was referred to a congressional 
committee.75 In June 2007, the Senate submitted S. 1639, a comprehensive 
immigration reform bill known as The Secure Borders, Economic 
Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (IRA 2007) to the 
floor.76 Among other immigration reforms, the IRA 2007 proposed 
increasing the cap to 115,000 for fiscal year 2008 and to 180,000 after 
that.77 In exchange for the cap increase, the bill proposed several 
restrictions on the H-1B program. First, it proposed eliminating “dual 
intent” for H-1B non-immigrants, preventing H-1 workers and their 
employers from seeking permanent residence status while in the United 
States.78 Second, it proposed subjecting all employers to burdensome rules 
currently applied only to “willful violators” or H-1B dependent 
employers.79 Such regulations would include requiring employers to make 
substantial efforts to locate U.S. workers with the necessary skill sets to fill 
the position.80
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at Sec. 8. 
 70. Id. at Sec. 10. 
 71. H.R. 3322, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 18, 2005). 
 Finally, IRA 2007 proposed the implementation of a $5,000 
“training fee” for each H-1B application. The “training fee” funds were to 
 72. GovTrack.us, H.R. 4378 [109th]: Defend the American Dream Act of 2005, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-4378 (confirming the bill was never passed 
and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims 
on Feb. 6, 2006); GovTrack.us, H.R. 3322 [109th]: USA Jobs Protection Act of 2005, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-3322 (confirming the bill was never passed 
and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims 
on Aug. 23, 2005). 
 73. GovTrack.us, S. 2802 (109th): American Innovation and Competitiveness Act of 2006, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-2802. 
 74. Lochhead, supra note 15. 
 75. GovTrack.us, S. 2802 (109th): American Innovation and Competitiveness Act of 2006, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-2802. 
 76. Stephen Yale-Loehr and Ted J. Chiappari, The Senate Immigration Reform Bill: The Case 
of the Twitching Toe, 12-13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 9 (July 1, 2007), appearing in N.Y.L.J., 
June 25, 2007. 
 77. Id. at 4. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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be allocated for educating and training U.S. workers.81 The bill never 
became law.82
In somewhat of a response to the defeat of IRA 2007, in August 2007 
Congress passed, and President Bush signed into law, the America Creating 
Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, 
Education, and Science Act (Competes Act),
 
83 which authorized “funding 
of $43.3 billion . . . for [science, technology, engineering, and mathematics] 
research and education programs at the federal level, including scholarship 
and grant programs.”84 The Competes Act was viewed as addressing the 
“long term challenges of building the pipeline for tech talent, although 
changes in immigration policies, including increasing the cap on H-1B 
visas, would help U.S. tech employers tackle the short term skills gap.”85 
While the Competes Act aims to meet the long-term challenges of the 
shortage of IT workers, it is unlikely to work in the short term; thus, U.S. 
employers still call for an increase in the cap.86
Recent reports and studies continue to document the increasing need for 
IT workers in the United States workforce. Specifically, the DOL publishes 
an annual Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) listing U.S. job 
positions, describing the education requirement, average earnings, and job 
outlook in the field.
 
87 For computer/technology related fields in 2006−2007, 
the OOH listed the outlook for most categories as expecting to increase 
“much faster than average.”88
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. 
 Furthermore, the DOL lists software 
publishers, scientific and technical consulting services, and computer 
 82. S. 1639, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 29, 2007); GovTrack.us, AGjobs Act of 2007, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1639 (Noting that as of October 20, 2007, 
“this bill is in the first stage of the legislative process where the bill is considered in committee 
and may undergo significant changes in markup sessions.”). 
 83. The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, 
Education, and Science Act, H.R. 2272, 110th Cong. (Aug. 9, 2007). 
 84. Congress Pushes for More Tech Education, R&D Programs, TECHWEB, Aug. 2, 2007. 
 85. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 86. Id. at 84. 
 87. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook 
2008/2009, www.bls.gov (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
 88. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook 
2008/2009: Computer Software Engineers, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos267.htm#outlook (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2009); Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook 2008/2009: 
Computer Support Specialists and Systems Administrators, 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos268.htm#outlook (last visited Jan. 4, 2009); Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook 2008/2009: Computer Systems 
Analysts, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos287.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009); Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook 2008/2009: Computer Scientists and 
Database Administrators, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos042.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). But see 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook 2008/2009: 
Computer Programmers, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos110.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
Computer Programmer is the only computer-related occupation where job growth is expected to 
be lower than average. Id. 
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systems design and related services in its top ten industries with the fastest 
wage and salary employment growth for 2004−2014.89
While the hype has quieted since the enactment of the Competes Act, 
interest groups will continue to mobilize, attempting to influence Congress 
for the next proposed immigration reform bill. Meanwhile, the U.S. labor 
market is suffering at the hands of the H-1B cap,
 
90 putting U.S. jobs at risk 
to off-shoring91 and putting the United States in danger of losing its most 
valuable resource in the twenty-first century, intellectual capital.92
IV. DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN INCREASE IN THE 
CAP AND AGAINST THE H-1B VISA CATEGORY IN 
GENERAL 
 
A. THE LABOR SHORTAGE 
One of the leading arguments against the H-1B category is that the IT 
industry’s “claim of a desperate labor shortage [is] invalid and was devised 
to hide the industry’s real goal − to use the H -1B program as a source of 
cheap labor.”93 Various software experts have published studies and have 
appeared before Congress to support their claims that no labor shortage 
exists.94
In order to refute the IT industry’s “labor shortage” claims as 
unreliable, critics refer to various other studies conducted around the time 
the ITAA reports were released.
 
95
                                                                                                                 
 89. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Industries With the Fastest Growing 
Wage and Salary Employment Growth, 2004-14, http://www.bls.gov/emp/empfastestind.htm (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
 90. See discussion infra Part V. 
 91. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 92. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 93. See generally Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 816 (arguing that the 
central issue behind the IT Industry’s claims of the shortage is money). See also Trucios-Haynes, 
supra note 47, at 967; Teitelbaum, supra note 46. 
 94. See Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 833. See also Matloff, Debunking 
the Myth, supra note 24. 
 95. See generally Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 833–39 (citing a study by 
economist Robert Lerman, “pointing out various methodological problems in the ITAA report” at 
835; a paper by Bureau of Labor Statistics researcher Carolyn Veneri, pointing out problems with 
the ITAA’s analysis of its data at 835–36; a statement by the Department of Commerce (DOC) in 
1999, reversing its position on the conclusiveness of the ITAA data at 836; a 1999 report issued 
by The Computer Research Association (CRA), noting additional “problems with the analyses of 
unemployment rates” at 836; a 2000 congressionally-commissioned National Research Counsel 
Report (NRC), noting a “‘tightness’ rather than a ‘shortage’” in the IT labor market at 839; an 
analysis by the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, expressing a “general puzzlement at 
the lack of good indicators in the data of a shortage” but noting that the industry’s claim was made 
in good faith at 839; and the IT Workforce Data Project, “a four-part series on the IT labor force,” 
“finding that one could not conclude from the data that there was a shortage” at 837–38). 
 However, the studies cited by critics 
point mainly to methodological problems in the data and analysis of the 
ITAA reports, rather than actually providing data counter-indicative of the 
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ITAA conclusions.96 In addition, proponents of the H-1B visa contend that 
the debate regarding the labor shortage is irrelevant because “the number of 
jobs available in America is not a static number . . . .”97 Rather, the labor 
market grows “based on several factors, including labor force growth, 
technology, education, entrepreneurship, and research and development.”98
Critics also claim that the apparent labor shortage is actually a result of 
U.S. employers’ “pickiness.”
 
Thus, prohibiting an increase in the entrance of highly skilled workers in 
the IT sector stifles the growth of that industry for both foreign and native 
workers. 
99 They assert that IT employers “have no 
shortage of incoming resumes,”100 that only approximately 2% of applicants 
actually are hired,101 and that most employers reject a majority “of the 
applicants they invite for in-house interviews.”102 While IT companies 
admittedly are selective,103 certain IT positions require particular skill 
sets.104 Without certain training or skills required by the position, an 
applicant will not be considered for it. Critics argue that, “good generic 
programming ability, not skills in particular programming languages, is 
what counts,”105 and that “workers are available, but not always at a price 
employers are willing to pay.”106
B. PAYING H-1B WORKERS THE PREVAILING WAGE 
 On the other hand, it seems unfair to place 
the burden and expense on employers to train under-qualified employees in 
the specific skill sets required for the position when there are workers 
available who are already trained. The issue is an ongoing circular debate. 
Critics assert that IT companies pay foreign workers less than 
comparable American workers.107
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. See also Trucios-Haynes, supra note 47, at 1007. The NRC Report “found that there is 
no formula to adopt the necessary number of H-1B visas.” A 1999 study by the National Science 
Foundation “found that there is no adequate information to answer the question of whether there is 
a shortage of information technology workers, but only inferential information.” Id. 
 97. NFAP, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10, at 3. 
 98. Id. at 3–4. 
 99. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 843. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 845. 
 102. Id. at 844 and Tables 2 and 3. 
 103. Id. at 845 (“When asked [the author’s] citing of a low 2 percent hiring rate, Microsoft 
admitted that it is ‘very, very selective.’”). 
 104. Id. at 846. 
 105. Id. at 864. 
 106. Id. at 847. 
 107. Id. at 816. 
 They occasionally refer to a 2004 report 
by John Miano for the Center on Immigration Studies (CIS Report), which 
asserts that wages paid to H-1B workers in computer programming 
occupations are significantly lower than wages paid to U.S. workers in the 
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same occupation and state.108 Specifically, the CIS Report asserts that the 
difference between wages paid to U.S. workers and wages paid to H-1B 
workers in fiscal year 2004 was over $18,000 per worker, on average.109 
The CIS Report notes that some of the largest IT companies in the United 
States paid their H-1B workers much less than the prevailing wage, 
including Motorola ($19,584), EMC Corporation ($15,004), eBay 
($14,493) and IBM ($12,681).110
However, the CIS Report is misleading for a number of reasons. First, 
the data utilized in this report does “not reveal what employers actually pay 
individuals on H-1B visas.”
 
111 The CIS Report data was taken from the 
LCAs filed with the Department of Labor in 2003. However, the wage data 
provided by employers on LCAs does not necessarily reflect what salary the 
H-1B holder actually receives.112 Rather, the prevailing wage reported on 
the LCA is a “minimum requirement and is usually lower than what the H-
1B visa holder actually receives,”113 making the CIS Report inherently 
flawed.114 For example, when employers complete the wage amount 
question on the LCA application, they may fill in the number that is the 
current prevailing wage as listed in the OOH, rather than the wage that they 
will actually pay the employee. Second, many of the other big name 
employers do, in fact, pay their workers “the premium wages one would 
expect for ‘highly skilled workers.’”115 For example, Apple is listed as 
paying its H-1B workers over $19,000 higher than the U.S. prevailing 
wage, with Sun Microsystems, Intuit and Qualcomm not far behind.116 
Third, these statistics do not strengthen the argument that employers abuse 
the system intentionally. Rather, the real problem lies with the law’s 
ineffectiveness in ensuring that H-1B workers are paid the prevailing 
wage.117
                                                                                                                 
 108. Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale, supra note 33, at 6. 
 109. Id. See also, Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 
10. 
 110. Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 13–14 Table 2. 
 111. NFAP, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10, at 9. 
 112. See id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 13–14 Table 2. 
 115. Id. at 14. 
 116. Id. at 13, Table 2. 
 Finally, various studies contradict critics’ findings of abuse and 
find, rather, that most employers pay H-1B workers more than U.S. 
 117. See Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale, supra note 33, at 8. See discussion on the LCA 
infra Section V. See also Susan Martin, B. Lindsay Lowell & Phillip Martin, U.S. Immigration 
Policy: Admission of High Skilled Workers, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 619, 632 (2002) (referring to 
Lindsay Lowell, Information Technology Companies and U.S. Immigration Policy: Hiring 
Foreign Workers, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, SCHOOL OF 
FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (2000), available at 
http://riim.metropolis.net/Virtual%20Library/2000/wp00S4.pdf. Studies show that “employers 
are, by and large, good actors and their need for highly skilled foreign workers is legitimate.” Id. 
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workers.118 Such studies take into account factors such as age,119 the 
benefits H-1B workers receive, and the expenditures U.S. employers incur 
in obtaining the H-1B visa.120 In addition, even though H-1B workers are 
not from the United States, they “are still smart people,” and “if 
[employers] try to fool with them,” these workers can and will simply go 
elsewhere because of the labor demand.121
C. DISPLACEMENT OF AMERICAN WORKERS 
 Therefore, the assertion that U.S. 
employers are “taking advantage” of foreign H-1B workers is simply not 
reasonable. 
Critics also argue that H-1B workers displace American workers,122 
especially older workers, women and minorities.123 “Older workers are 
perceived as being more expensive than younger ones,”124 and thus “when 
employers exhaust the supply of young American workers, they turn to 
hiring younger H-1Bs in lieu of older Americans.”125 Some companies 
acknowledge that while “they would prefer to hire an American to avoid the 
paperwork and lawyer’s fees involved in sponsoring a foreign worker’s 
visa,” some managers “don’t hire many Americans because recruiting them 
is time consuming; most of the resumes they receive from their human 
resources department[s] are for foreign workers.”126
Yet Congress has implemented a number of safeguards in the H-1B 
visa category to prevent displacement of U.S. workers. One example is the 
ACWIA 98 legislation,
 
127 wherein Congress directed the National Research 
Council to study this issue of displacement of older American workers.128 
The report, released in late 2000, confirmed that “older IT workers indeed 
faced major obstacles in finding work in the field, even during boom 
times.”129
                                                                                                                 
 118. NFAP, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10, at 5 (referring to research by Paul E. 
Harrington, associate director for the Center for Labor Market Studies at Northeastern University). 
 119. See id. at 5–7. 
 120. Id. at 6–7 and Table 1. 
 121. Hahm, supra note 31, at 1697 n.170 (quoting “a foreign-born engineer who interviews 
prospective hires”). 
 122. Schiller, supra note 22, at 650. 
 123. Carrie Kirby, On the Sidelines; H-1B Leaves Minority Workers on Sidelines, Groups Say, 
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2000 at B1 (“Many African Americans, Latinos, women, older workers and 
other groups underrepresented in the high-tech industry say the H-1B program . . . is short-
circuiting their opportunities.”). 
 124. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 887. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Kirby, supra note 123, at B1. 
 127. ACWIA 98, supra note 50. 
 128. See id. at 656; see also Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 826. 
 129. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 826. 
 Congress has made attempts to curb the H-1B effect on older 
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workers by funding the training of older American workers in the 
technology field with an extra fee imposed on H-1B visa applications.130
In addition, there is evidence that “failure to raise the H-1B ceiling is 
what will deprive Americans of jobs in the high-tech industry.”
 
131 A 
number of the largest IT firms in the United States employing U.S. and 
foreign workers such as Sun Microsystems,132 Google,133 Intel,134 Oracle 
and Computer Associates were either partly or totally founded by 
foreigners.135 For example, “James Gosling, a Canadian national, developed 
the Java platform that transformed computer software development.”136
D. BODY SHOPPING 
 
Non-U.S. employers create thousands of jobs in the United States, thus 
weakening the correlation between immigration and displacement of U.S. 
workers. 
Critics argue that many U.S. employers abuse the H-1B program, 
specifically with the use of “body shopping.” Body shopping is the name 
given to the practice whereby placement agencies bring H-1B visa workers 
into the United States and “then contract the workers out to other 
companies on a work-for-hire basis, in an attempt to avoid statutory wage 
requirements.”137 The advantage of body shopping for employers is that 
they can pay the employees lower wages by allowing the contracting 
employer to claim it never hired any H-1B workers, and the body shopping 
company to say it never fired any U.S. employees.138
There are a multitude of problems with the practice of body shopping. 
“[B]ody shops circulate lists of available H-1B workers to employers, 
placing them in direct competition with U.S. workers seeking similar 
jobs.”
 While body shopping 
is a large problem in the United States for various reasons discussed more 
fully below, body shopping is likely a result of, rather than a justification 
for, the cap. 
139
                                                                                                                 
 130. ACWIA 98, supra note 50, at 652; see also Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 
11, at 825. It is argued, however, that this plan failed because the money was used to train workers 
in alternate fields. Matloff, On the Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 826. 
 131. Schiller, supra note 22, at 650. 
 132. Id. at 651. 
 133. Traven, supra note 29, at 693. 
 134. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1. 
 135. See Editorial, Review and Outlook: Jobs and Immigrants, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2005, at 
A12. 
 136. Schiller, supra note 22, at 651. 
 137. Goodsell, supra note 20, at 156. 
 138. Id. at 168. See also Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 
22, at 17. 
 139. Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale, supra note 33, at 4. 
 Body shopping also leads to abuse of foreign workers. For 
example, since companies contract out their H-1B workers, sometimes not 
all of the workers have work assignments. Instead of paying the workers the 
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prevailing wage as they are required to do, body shopping agencies “bench” 
the H-1B workers by not paying them or “pay[ing] them a reduced rate 
when they have no actual work.”140 In addition, body shopping adds to the 
problem of displacement of U.S. workers141
Some studies claim that the top twenty H-1B employers in the United 
States, with the exception of Oracle, are body shoppers.
 because the H-1B workers are 
paid lower wages and are thus more attractive to employers. 
142 In addition, the 
same studies estimate that two-thirds of the H-1B workers “in computer 
programming occupations are going to employers in the . . . [body 
shopping] industries.”143 If body shopping is actually as prevalent as some 
critics assert, then body shopping employers frustrate the aims of the H-1B 
program by abusing foreign workers, displacing U.S. workers and using up 
much needed visas otherwise available for legitimate employment 
positions. Thus, those opposing an increase in the visa cap argue that by 
banning the practice of body shopping or limiting the number of H-1B visas 
a single employer can have, a great majority of visas will open up, quashing 
the necessity of increasing the cap.144
Instead, however, the H-1B cap may be the cause of body shopping in 
the United States, and if the cap is abolished, the practice of body shopping 
will likely decline or disappear altogether. In 2003, once the cap reverted to 
65,000 from 195,000,
 
145 employment placement agencies and consulting 
firms such as MindTree and Wipro, two of the largest body shoppers, began 
“scrambling to build teams of visa-ready people.”146 They were forced to 
anticipate what skills their clients would need in the next few years and thus 
make efforts to mobilize enough H-1B visas to “manage a supply imbalance 
that was expected to emerge . . . .”147 Thus, the 65,000 cap created a high 
demand for H-1B visas, which led employment and recruiting agencies to 
obtain as many H-1B workers as possible for themselves and their 
clients.148
                                                                                                                 
 140. Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 18. 
 141. Id. at 18. 
 142. Goodsell, supra note 20, at 168 (citing Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on 
Immigration, supra note 22). These body shopping companies include Wipro Ltd., Infosys 
Technologies, Syntel, HPS America, IBM Global Service India, Tata Consultancy Services, 
Satyam Computer Services, Patni Computer Systems, Mphasis Corporation, Intelligroup, 
eBusiness Application Solutions, iGate Mastech, HCL Technologies America, Tata Infotech, 
Enterprise Business Solutions, Cognizant Technology Solutions, Rapidigm, IntelliQuest Systems 
and Jags Software. Id. 
 143. Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 9. 
 144. Goodsell, supra note 20, at 171. 
 145. Saritha Rai, Cap on U.S. Work Visas Puts Companies in India in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
1, 2003 at W1. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 In turn, as a result of these agencies hoarding H-1B visas, it is 
likely that the abusive body shopping practices developed because the 
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agencies could not afford to pay H-1B workers who were not assigned to 
jobs. Therefore, raising or abolishing the cap will reduce the pressure to 
mobilize a supply of H-1B visas, thus eliminating the practice of body 
shopping altogether. 
E. PROBLEMS WITH THE LCA 
The LCA is the principal means through which the Department of 
Labor “regulates” the H-1B visa category. The avowed purpose of the LCA 
process is to assist the employer in determining whether “there ‘are not 
sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and available’ and 
that the employment of the non-citizen ‘will not adversely affect the wages 
and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly 
employed.’”149 Many critics argue that the current LCA system “is grossly 
inefficient and, at worst, irrational”150 because it is not sufficient to 
accomplish its purpose.151 Further, critics argue that the LCA “does not tell 
what happens beyond the labor condition process,” and thus is inadequate 
to monitor and protect H-1B workers once they disappear into the U.S. 
interior.152
Prior to filing its H-1B petition, the U.S. employer must undergo a four-
step labor certification process in order to sufficiently complete the LCA. 
The first and most troubling step of the labor certification process is to 
establish the wage requirement for the position to be filled and to 
acknowledge that the employer will pay the H-1B employee the required 
wage rate.
 
153 The “wage rate” is defined as “the greater of the actual wage 
rate . . . or the prevailing wage . . . .”154 One of the greatest criticisms of the 
LCA is the way “wage rate” is defined in the statute.155 The statutory 
definition of “actual wage” is the “rate paid by the employer to all other 
individuals with similar experience and qualifications for the specific 
employment in question. In determining such wage level, the following 
factors may be considered: experience, qualifications, education, job 
responsibility and function, specialized knowledge, and other legitimate 
business factors.”156
the employer shall base the prevailing wage on the best information as of 
the time of filing the application . . . . [T]he employer is not required to 
use any specific methodology to determine the prevailing wage and may 
 To determine the prevailing wage, 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Trucios-Haynes, supra note 47, at 979–80 (citing IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(i) (2000). 
 150. Trucios-Haynes, supra note 47, at 986. 
 151. See generally id. 
 152. Miano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration, supra note 22, at 6. 
 153. 20 C.F.R. 655.731 (2009). 
 154. 20 C.F.R. 655.731(a) (2009). 
 155. See generally Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale, supra note 33. 
 156. 20 C.F.R. 655.731(a)(1) (2009). 
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utilize a [state employment service agency], an independent authoritative 
source, or other legitimate sources of data.157
Allowing an employer to base its determination of wage on either the 
wage amount paid to similar employees or by the “best information,” 
without requiring any “specific methodology,” gives employers too much 
freedom in designating the wage rate for the position.
  
158 Studies show that 
the value of prevailing wages claimed in LCA applications is not 
representative of the actual prevailing wage of a given occupation.159 
Further, there is no actual person evaluating the employer’s asserted wage 
rate.160 Thus, only if the employee makes a complaint will the wage rate be 
subject to scrutiny.161
The remaining requirements of an employer under the labor condition 
process include that the employer assert: (1) “that the employment of H-1B 
non-immigrants will not adversely affect the working conditions of workers 
similarly employed in the area of intended employment;”
 
162 (2) that “there 
is not at that time a strike or lockout in the course of a labor dispute in the 
occupational classification at the place of employment;”163 and (3) that “the 
employer has provided notice of the filing of the labor condition application 
to the bargaining representative of the employer’s employees . . . or, if there 
is no such bargaining representative, has posted notice of filing in 
conspicuous locations in the employer’s establishment(s) in the area of 
intended employment . . . .”164 Again, like the determination of the wage 
rate, the LCA requires only a statement by the employer of the truthfulness 
of the application.165 There is no administrative review of any of the 
statements until a complaint of abuse is made.166 Further, unless the 
employer is an H-1B dependent, there is no requirement that the employer 
make any attempt to recruit U.S. workers for the position.167 Many of the 
problems asserted by critics of the H-1B visa, including failure of 
employers to pay the prevailing wage,168
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 displacement of U.S. workers for 
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lower paid H-1B employees169 and abuse by body shopping agencies,170
V. SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS FOR INCREASING THE CAP 
 are 
a result of the failure of the LCA system to act as a safeguard. As a result, 
the LCA process is in dire need of reform, and any H-1B reform legislation 
will need to include LCA reforms in addition to an increase in the cap. 
In addition to the high demand for workers, proponents remind us that 
the H-1B visa enables the world’s best and brightest to come to the United 
States, allowing it to maintain its status as a leading innovative economy.171 
“In today’s knowledge-based economy, capturing value from intellectual 
capital and knowledge-based assets has gained even more importance. 
Global competition is no longer for the control of raw materials, but for this 
productive knowledge.”172 If the cap remains at 65,000 and companies are 
not able to hire the workers they need, there will be severely detrimental 
effects on the U.S. economy. More companies will begin off-shoring their 
operations to more immigration-friendly nations such as Canada, Germany 
and the United Kingdom, or to countries where labor is less expensive.173 
Furthermore, fewer foreign nationals will enroll in U.S. universities because 
they will have no hope of remaining in the United States after graduation.174 
While all agree that the H-1B category needs reform, proponents argue that 
the protections mandated by the USCIS are taken seriously and that critics 
over-exaggerate the abuse of the category.175
A. THE LOW CAP DEPRIVES THE U.S. OF MUCH-NEEDED 
INNOVATIVE TALENT 
   
Proponents of raising the cap argue that preventing foreign students 
who attend U.S. universities from accepting positions in the United States 
“will be detrimental to our economic success because the United States will 
                                                                                                                 
 169. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
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 175. See generally NFAP: Setting the Record Straight, supra note 10. 
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lose valuable intellectual capital.”176 Some allege that U.S. visa policies, 
specifically Congress’s refusal to raise the H-1B cap, “are primarily to 
blame for the decline in international student enrollment in U.S. academic 
institutions.”177 Thousands of foreign students enter the United States each 
year on F, M and J visas to attend U.S. universities.178 Not only is their 
attendance at these universities beneficial to the economy by injecting 
capital through tuition and living expenses,179 but their creative ideas are 
also crucial to our modern economy, which focuses on innovation.180 The 
cap prevents many of these graduating students from being placed in jobs in 
the United States, forcing them to return to their home countries.181 Thus, 
“instead of maximally retaining foreign talent . . . U.S. immigration policies 
have expelled such individuals back to their home countries, where they 
have contributed to local workforces’ ability to compete on a national basis 
with the [United States].”182
In addition to the loss of a well-educated workforce, the H-1B cap 
prevents the United States from being credited for the innovation of 
valuable intellectual property. In 2006, foreign nationals residing in the 
United States filed 25.6% of the international patent applications.
 
183 
“Foreign nationals and foreign residents contributed to more than half of the 
international patents” filed by multi-national companies such as Qualcomm, 
Merck & Co., General Electric, Siemens and Cisco in 2006.184 Furthermore, 
“41% of the patents filed by the U.S. government had foreign nationals or 
foreign residents as inventors or co-inventors.”185 In addition, 16.8% and 
13.7% of international patent applications from the United States had an 
inventor or co-inventor with a Chinese or Indian-heritage name, 
respectively.186 Finally, one study shows that “for every 100 international 
students who receive science or engineering Ph.D.’s from American 
universities, the nation gains 62 future patent applications.”187
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 187. Stuart Anderson, The Debate Over Immigration’s Impact on U.S. Workers and the 
Economy, NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN POLICY (July 2006) (citing Gnanajaraj 
Chellaraj, Keith E. Maskus, and Aiditya Matoo, The Contribution of Skilled Immigration and 
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from these statistics that the U.S. economy is dependent on the innovative 
ideas of foreigners. “‘Economists worry about another place owning the 
very next big thing’ – the next ground breaking technology . . . . ‘If the 
heart and mind of the next great thing emerges somewhere else because the 
talent is there, then we will be hurt.’”188 If the H-1B cap remains at this 




Proponents of the H-1B visa argue that the visa cap threatens to set the 
United States behind in innovation and science and actually increases 
layoffs of U.S. workers because it encourages off-shoring.190 If employers 
in the United States cannot hire foreign workers with the experience and 
training required, “then companies who are trying to remain globally 
competitive are left with only one solution: shifting those operations off-
shore.”191 Many U.S. companies “concede that the uncertainty created by 
Congress’ inability to provide a reliable mechanism to hire skilled 
professionals has encouraged placing more human resources outside the 
United States to avoid being subject to legislative winds.”192
While the practice of off-shoring began mainly with the working class, 
commonly with apparel workers, and then moved into areas like customer 
service (as with American Express), a number of IT industry leaders such as 
IBM have begun the practice of off-shoring some of their technical support 
positions and software jobs.
 
193 Companies are finding that “knowledge-
based endeavors,” such as technical support positions and software jobs, 
“require relatively little overhead costs beyond a basic telecommunications 
infrastructure.”194
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 193. Halliday, supra note 190, at 408–09. 
 194. Yang, supra note 51, at 153. 
 Moreover, information-based productive activities 
involve far less complex issues of coordination by virtue of the ability of 
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work products to “move unencumbered by the limits of time and space as 
bits and pixels in global communication networks.”195
Most recently, Microsoft Corp. announced the plan to open a large 
software development center in Vancouver to enable it to “recruit and retain 
highly skilled people affected by immigration issues in the [United 
States].”
 
196 The stated benefits for companies engaging in off-shoring are 
plentiful and include cheaper labor (which benefits consumers), economic 
efficiency and the ability to bring new job opportunities to third world 
nations.197 However, off-shoring has many disadvantages including the loss 
of American jobs, which forces more people into unemployment and hurts 
the U.S. economy.198 Other disadvantages include the risk of abuse of 
workers in foreign countries who are forced to work for low wages199 and 
most relevant, the risk of the United States “losing its leading role in 
innovation.”200 If the cap remains low, then foreigners who make up a 
significant portion of U.S. university science graduates, and “who have 
been extremely helpful to U.S. technological success” will no longer be 
able to come to the United States with their creative and innovative ideas,201
As more and more U.S.-educated foreign students are forced to leave 
the United States after graduation for lack of available visas, they return to 
their home countries, which become “attractive locales for off-shoring.”
 
thus depriving the United States of the vital brain power needed to remain a 
leading intellectual influence in the global realm. 
202
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The cap on the H-1B visa “has resulted in a highly educated class of 
knowledge workers in Asian countries that is acculturated to U.S. business 
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practices and prepared to conduct business on global terms.”203 Thus, U.S.-
trained talent returns to its home countries where U.S. companies have 
established operations for cheaper wages and less overhead.204
C. THE LOW CAP ON H-1B VISAS HURTS HIRING PRACTICES OF 
U.S. COMPANIES 
 
The impact of the low visa cap has been felt by large and small 
companies alike. Companies argue that the current cap “considerably 
hampers . . . hiring practices.”205 Google, whose co-founder Sergey Brin 
came from the Soviet Union as a young boy,206 reported that in 2007 the 
low H-1B cap “prevented more than 70 candidates from receiving H-1B 
visas.207 Further, Google’s Executive Vice President of People Operations, 
Lazlo Bock, testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Immigration in June 2007 that failing to increase the visa cap could be 
disastrous for the U.S. economy because, “unfortunately, many . . . valued 
employees become frustrated with the inefficiencies in the immigration 
system, give up because of the up to five-year waits, and either move home 
or seek employment in more welcoming countries, countries that are direct 
economic competitors to the United States.”208 Even Bill Gates reported 
that “the visa pinch is hurting [Microsoft’s] ability to complete new 
projects.”209 Smaller institutions are also affected by the cap. For example, 
Oklahoma State University reported in 2007 that 223 of its faculty and staff 
(more than 10% of the school’s total) were in the United States on H-1B 
visas and that “if [they] are going to do the best research and development, 
[they] need to have the best and brightest minds.”210
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 Thus, if Congress 
refuses to increase or eliminate the cap, the frustration of U.S. IT companies 
will continue, leading to higher American job losses due to off-shoring, and 
the IT sector of the economy will continue to be stifled. Therefore, 
Congress should take action towards rectifying these issues. 
478 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 3 
VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM: PROPOSED REFORMS TO 
THE H-1B CATEGORY 
Any reforms implemented by Congress to the H-1B category should 
focus on meeting the goals of the statute, i.e. bringing the best and brightest 
minds to the United States, preventing displacement of U.S. workers, 
providing U.S. employers with adequately trained employees, and 
protecting H-1B workers from labor abuses. Possible reforms to the H-1B 
category include eliminating the cap entirely and, instead, setting up a 
sliding scale limiting the number of H-1B workers a company may hire 
based on the percentage of employees at the company; continuing to offer 
the option of permanent residency to H-1B workers, making LCA 
applications readily available to the public; and imposing stricter penalties 
for labor or fraud violations. These proposed reforms are discussed more 
fully below. 
A. ELIMINATE THE CAP ENTIRELY 
Since the H-1B program was designed to allow the United States to 
remain at the forefront of the global economy, “the program ought to 
maximize its potential economic benefits by increasing its efficiency and 
flexibility, the ability to easily adapt to the fast changing global 
economy.”211 Arbitrary caps do not promote efficiency and flexibility, but 
rather hinder American companies in the “unpredictable, fast-paced, and 
fiercely competitive global high-tech labor markets of the twenty-first 
century.”212 The amount of H-1B visas issued each year should either be 
controlled by the labor market213 or by percentage limits, rather than strict 
numerical caps. Regarding the labor market as the determining factor for H-
1Bs, proponents note that in 2002 and 2003 the labor market controlled the 
demand for H-1B visas.214 In both of those years, the H-1B cap was set at 
195,000;215 however, fewer than 80,000 visas were issued in either of those 
years, leaving 230,000 H-1B visas unused.216
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 Thus, employers “did not hire 
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more H-1Bs just because the cap was higher.”217
B. DO NOT TAKE AWAY OPPORTUNITIES FOR PERMANENT 
RESIDENCY FOR H-1B WORKERS 
 Instead, employers 
requested H-1B employees according to their need. 
A sliding scale percentage may work equally as well. For example, 
Congress should limit H-1Bs for small companies (10−25 employees) to 
30% of their employees; for medium employers (25−200 employees) to 
15%; and for large employers (201−1000+ employees) to 5%. This will 
effectively eliminate body shopping and the inflexible deadline of April 1 
for H-1B applications. It will also protect U.S. workers from displacement. 
Both the labor market determinate and the sliding scale will also allow the 
United States to retain valuable intellectual capital by allowing foreign 
students to remain in the United States after graduation and by allowing 
U.S. companies facing a labor shortage to recruit foreign employees. Either 
method will also appease companies’ hiring needs, preventing many U.S. 
companies from moving offshore. 
As mentioned in Part III, dual intent allows workers in the United 
States on nonimmigrant visas, such as the H-1B, to apply for permanent 
resident status while in the United States.218 If awarded permanent resident 
status, employees and their families are able to stay in the United States 
indefinitely.219
C. PUBLISH LCA APPLICATIONS 
 One of the main goals of U.S. immigration and the H-1B 
category is to bring the best and brightest to the United States. If these 
employees are forced to leave after their six-year stay is completed, the 
immigration purpose is defeated and the United States not only deprives 
itself of valuable brain power, but also allows other countries to compete 
with the U.S. economy. Therefore, Congress should not eliminate the dual 
intent option for H-1B workers. 
LCA applications should be published on the DOL website, in a manner 
similar to job openings on employment websites. Currently, employers are 
required to post their LCAs in two or more conspicuous locations at each 
place of employment where any H-1B employee will be employed for thirty 
days.220
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to publish LCA applications on its website.221 An automatic electronic 
posting requires minimal administrative cost and can be done efficiently 
with little cost to the government.222 Posting LCAs on the DOL website will 
allow more U.S. workers to discover available job opportunities. If the 
burden of recruiting U.S. workers is one of the main reasons that U.S. 
companies hire foreign workers instead of U.S. workers,223
In addition to advertising job openings, published LCAs will allow the 
public to monitor companies that submit a high number of LCAs. If a 
company’s hiring practices are disclosed, it will pay more attention to the 
number of H-1B applications it submits, and it will have to answer to the 
public’s scrutiny, curbing the need for government regulation.
 published LCA 
applications will bring U.S. workers directly to employers, eliminating the 
recruitment need and expense for employers. 
224
D. IMPLEMENT STRICTER PENALTIES FOR ABUSE 
 
As a further check on U.S. employers and body-shopping agencies, the 
government should create stricter penalties, including criminal penalties, for 
willfully providing false information on LCA applications. Criminal 
penalties for fraud will work in conjunction with the publicly available 
LCAs mentioned above. Employees and the public can compare the 
information reported on LCAs to the actual practices of employers. If there 
are serious and fraudulent discrepancies, the public will report such 
discrepancies to the authorities. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The expiration of the 2008 cap on the first day of the application 
window is clear evidence that the current cap of 65,000 is inadequate for the 
current U.S. labor market. Furthermore, the arbitrary cap itself is damaging 
to U.S. companies seeking the world’s best talent and the brightest 
employees. Not only does the cap threaten the United States’ position as the 
world’s leading possessor of intellectual capital, it also threatens U.S. jobs 
and continued growth of the U.S. labor market, especially in the IT 
industry. Congress should reform the H-1B category as soon as possible by 
taking into consideration the issues and recommendations discussed herein. 
In light of the current economic crisis in the United States and throughout 
the rest of the world, the U.S. economy is at risk of falling behind other 
nations and allowing important ideas to fall into the wrong hands. 
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Congress’s first priority should be to secure valuable intellectual capital and 
keep it within the United States. Eliminating or at least increasing the H-1B 
visa cap will be one important step in the right direction. 
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